Today’s article is, basically, a continuation of the discussion which was started in my presentation of 2nd June, 2022, under the heading: “CCM WELCOMES POLITICAL RECONCILIATION”; in which we focused on the ruling party’s traditional commitment to seeking political reconciliation with the Opposition political parties.
In today’s presentation, we will focus on the ruling party’s specific efforts in forging political reconciliation in Zanzibar, during the initial difficult years of ‘disagreements and boycotts’ by the main Opposition party in Zanzibar, which, at the time, the Civic United Front (CUF).
Zanzibar’s pre-revolution electoral history had been unduly complicated by recurrent post-election disagreements, often leading to actual violence; plus the unfairly biased electoral process, which led to that country being granted independence by Britain on December 12th, 1963; with the Arab Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdullah, as the ruler thereof. Indeed, there was a general feeling, particularly among members and supporters of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), that the electoral process that led to Zanzibas independence, had been grossly unfair to the non-Arab African majority population in Zanzibar.
In today’s presentation, we will focus on the ruling party’s specific efforts in forging political reconciliation in Zanzibar, during the initial difficult years of ‘disagreements and boycotts’ by the main Opposition party in Zanzibar, which, at the time, the Civic United Front (CUF).
Zanzibar’s pre-revolution electoral history had been unduly complicated by recurrent post-election disagreements, often leading to actual violence; plus the unfairly biased electoral process, which led to that country being granted independence by Britain on December 12th, 1963; with the Arab Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdullah, as the ruler thereof. Indeed, there was a general feeling, particularly among members and supporters of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), that the electoral process that led to Zanzibas independence, had been grossly unfair to the non-Arab African majority population in Zanzibar.
This unfairness was reflected in the way the various electoral constituencies had been gerrymandered. Thus, even though the ASP received the majority of votes in the pre-independence general election of 1963; the Arab coalition of ZNP and ZPPP obtained the majority of the seats in the Zanzibar Legislature.
This is what inevitably led to the ‘glorious Revolution’; which overthrew the ZNP/ZPPP government in January, 1964; and consequently, which created the conditions which made it possible for the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, to take place.
A brief history of Zanzibar’s post- election disputes.
Post-election disputes in Zanzibar have a very long history, going back to the first general election which was held in Zanzibar in 1957, during the period of the British colonial Administration there. Membership of the three political parties, which participated in this election were all based on race. They were:-the Afro-Shirazi party; whose membership was predominantly African; the Zanzibar Nationalist party, whose membership was predominantly Arab; and the Muslim Association, whose membership was predominantly Indian. That general election was held in six constituencies; and, according to the official; the Afro-Shirazi party won in five of those constituencies, while the sixth constituency was won by the Muslim Association.
A brief history of Zanzibar’s post- election disputes.
Post-election disputes in Zanzibar have a very long history, going back to the first general election which was held in Zanzibar in 1957, during the period of the British colonial Administration there. Membership of the three political parties, which participated in this election were all based on race. They were:-the Afro-Shirazi party; whose membership was predominantly African; the Zanzibar Nationalist party, whose membership was predominantly Arab; and the Muslim Association, whose membership was predominantly Indian. That general election was held in six constituencies; and, according to the official; the Afro-Shirazi party won in five of those constituencies, while the sixth constituency was won by the Muslim Association.
Thus, the Arab Zanzibar Nationalist party lost in all he constituencies. In the words of the Zanzibar government’s Annual Report for the year 1958; these results quickly produced a socio-political impasse. The said Report says thus: “The general election of 1957 will be remembered for the manner in which it affected the lives of every community in Zanzibar. Traders, farmers, employed workers, fishermen, wakwezi, and even housewives; were badly affected.
Followers of different political parties boycotted funerals related to their political rivals, and even boycotted their religious functions. These were the negative consequences created by the results of the first general election in these Islands, whose people were previously living happily together, in total harmony and peace.”
But similar post-election violence occurred in the subsequent general elections, starting with that of January 1961, where it is reported that “68 people were killed in the ensuing violence, and 350 others were injured”. And the June 1961 general election, which also produced similar violent disagreements.
Then came the pre-independence general election of October, 1963; in which the Afro-Shirazi Party had obtained 54% of the total votes cast; but because of the colonial Administration’s gerrymandering of the electoral constituencies in the Arab stronghold in Pemba; the ASP was able to obtain only a minority of 13 Legislative seats; while the coalition of the Arab Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and its ally the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party, obtained a disproportionate majority of 18 Legislative seats.
But similar post-election violence occurred in the subsequent general elections, starting with that of January 1961, where it is reported that “68 people were killed in the ensuing violence, and 350 others were injured”. And the June 1961 general election, which also produced similar violent disagreements.
Then came the pre-independence general election of October, 1963; in which the Afro-Shirazi Party had obtained 54% of the total votes cast; but because of the colonial Administration’s gerrymandering of the electoral constituencies in the Arab stronghold in Pemba; the ASP was able to obtain only a minority of 13 Legislative seats; while the coalition of the Arab Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and its ally the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party, obtained a disproportionate majority of 18 Legislative seats.
The post-January 1964 Revolution situation.
Following the success of the January 1964 Revolution, which brought the Afro-Shirazi Party into power, and placed President Abeid Amani Karume on the “throne” as the President of the Peoples’ Republic of Zanzibar; President Karume, presumably out of accumulated anger and rage generated by the crooked way the Afro-Sirazi Party had been unfairly denied victory by the colonial Administration where it had obtained the majority of the votes cast; angrily declared that “there would be no elections in Zanzibar for the next fifty years”.
The return to multiparty politics.
Thus, with the re-introduction of the multi-party political system in the United Republic of Tanzania in 1992, the Zanzibar political scene quickly became characterized by a serious rift between Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the United Civic Front (CUF); following the latter’s refusal to accept the results of the first multi-party general election of 1995; when Zanzibar unfortunately returned to its former, pre-revolution position of antagonism between the two main political parties, CCM and CUF.
These were, in effect, the successors of the old antagonistic parties of the colonial period; with CCM being the true successor of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP); and CUF being the presumed successor to the former Arab coalition of ZNP, and ZPPP.
Following the success of the January 1964 Revolution, which brought the Afro-Shirazi Party into power, and placed President Abeid Amani Karume on the “throne” as the President of the Peoples’ Republic of Zanzibar; President Karume, presumably out of accumulated anger and rage generated by the crooked way the Afro-Sirazi Party had been unfairly denied victory by the colonial Administration where it had obtained the majority of the votes cast; angrily declared that “there would be no elections in Zanzibar for the next fifty years”.
The return to multiparty politics.
Thus, with the re-introduction of the multi-party political system in the United Republic of Tanzania in 1992, the Zanzibar political scene quickly became characterized by a serious rift between Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the United Civic Front (CUF); following the latter’s refusal to accept the results of the first multi-party general election of 1995; when Zanzibar unfortunately returned to its former, pre-revolution position of antagonism between the two main political parties, CCM and CUF.
These were, in effect, the successors of the old antagonistic parties of the colonial period; with CCM being the true successor of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP); and CUF being the presumed successor to the former Arab coalition of ZNP, and ZPPP.
For as had been the case during the colonial period, the results of the 1995 general election were immediately disputed by CUF; which refused to recognize them; and announced its total ‘ non-cooperation’ with the incoming CCM government. This included boycotts by CUF of all the sessions of the Zanzibar House of Representatives; as well as of the Union Parliament.
But boycotting these sessions had its own adverse consequences, in the sense that such action offended the Constitutions both of Zanzibar, and of the United Republic; both of which provide that any member of these Institutions, “shall cease to be such member, if he/she fails to attend three consecutive sessions thereof, without the express permission of the Speaker”.
Thus, since neither of the two Speakers had granted permission to the boycotting parties, all of them just lost their seats (automatically) in their respective Legislatures, on the last day of the third consecutive session.
The efforts at achieving reconciliation.
Immediately thereafter, the two sides embarked on a serious dialogue, aimed at reconciling the two parties. And, fortunately, with the helpful intervention of the then Nigerian Commonwealth Secretary General, Emeka Anyaoku, this dialogue produced a ‘peace Agreement’ which was signed in 1999; that subsequently became known as ‘MUAFAKA I’ in Kiswahili, under which CUF undertook to lift their boycott of the two Legislatures, after the 2000 general election.
In the ugly situation of the inevitable political impasse that followed the 1995 first multiparty general election, some of the CUF leaders and supporters even started engaging themselves in unlawful acts aimed at undermining the lawful Zanzibar Government; whereupon the government reacted strongly in order to maintain peace; with the result that some of them were arrested and charged with the offence of treason; thus causing many CUF leaders and members to flee to a place called Shimoni in Mombasa, Kenya; for fear of being similarly arrested.
The efforts at achieving reconciliation.
Immediately thereafter, the two sides embarked on a serious dialogue, aimed at reconciling the two parties. And, fortunately, with the helpful intervention of the then Nigerian Commonwealth Secretary General, Emeka Anyaoku, this dialogue produced a ‘peace Agreement’ which was signed in 1999; that subsequently became known as ‘MUAFAKA I’ in Kiswahili, under which CUF undertook to lift their boycott of the two Legislatures, after the 2000 general election.
In the ugly situation of the inevitable political impasse that followed the 1995 first multiparty general election, some of the CUF leaders and supporters even started engaging themselves in unlawful acts aimed at undermining the lawful Zanzibar Government; whereupon the government reacted strongly in order to maintain peace; with the result that some of them were arrested and charged with the offence of treason; thus causing many CUF leaders and members to flee to a place called Shimoni in Mombasa, Kenya; for fear of being similarly arrested.
These events quickly created a very serious political impasse, which also caused great injury to the normal social relationships within the Zanzibar community, when such boycotts were extended to social events like weddings and funerals.
This ugly situation lasted for about four years, while a dialogue which had been initiated by CCM between the two sides was in progress. Eventually, this dialogue resulted in the signing of a ‘Peace Agreement’; which subsequently became known as “MUAFAKA I” in Kiswahili.
The 2000 general election.
But, unfortunately, the same problem re-surfaced with regard to the 2000 general election, and with even greater intensity, when CUF again raised the complaint that “CCM had manipulated the Presidential election in its favour”. In January 2001; a tragedy occurred in Pemba, where CUF held a demonstration, ostensibly to protest against the Presidential election.
This ugly situation lasted for about four years, while a dialogue which had been initiated by CCM between the two sides was in progress. Eventually, this dialogue resulted in the signing of a ‘Peace Agreement’; which subsequently became known as “MUAFAKA I” in Kiswahili.
The 2000 general election.
But, unfortunately, the same problem re-surfaced with regard to the 2000 general election, and with even greater intensity, when CUF again raised the complaint that “CCM had manipulated the Presidential election in its favour”. In January 2001; a tragedy occurred in Pemba, where CUF held a demonstration, ostensibly to protest against the Presidential election.
However, in the course of that demonstration, the protesters beheaded a policeman who was on duty in the path of the demonstration, and then set off towards a police station, which was an armory, chanting the words “we are going to collect weapons”. They reached that Police station, and clashed with the small police contingent that was stationed there who, in view of the real danger of being overcome and losing the weapons to the protesters, responded by firing at the demonstrators, killing 22 of them.
The protest against the Presidential results was caused by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission’s action of nullifying the election in all the 16 constituencies of the Urban West Region, and announcing a re-run of that election on a later date; whereupon CUF, supported by some of the other Opposition parties, decided to boycott the said election re-run.
The protest against the Presidential results was caused by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission’s action of nullifying the election in all the 16 constituencies of the Urban West Region, and announcing a re-run of that election on a later date; whereupon CUF, supported by some of the other Opposition parties, decided to boycott the said election re-run.
The Civic United Front once again refused to accept the results of the Presidential election when it candidate was declared to have lost that election; and the 1995 boycotts were repeated, plus the breaches of the law, which similarly re-occurred. Consequently, some of the CUF leaders were arrested and charged with the offence of treason. This led to a significant number of CUF leaders and members fleeing to Shimoni in Momasa, Kenya, for fear of being similarly arrested.
This again created a nasty political impasse; which called for a resumption of the dialogue between CCM and CUF. These second “peace talks” were again successful, and resulted in the signing of another ‘Peace Agreement’, which subsequently became known as MUAFAKA II.
The 2005 general election.
Once again, the CUF Presidential candidate lost in the 2005 Presidential election. And CUF refused to accept those results. Thus, another political impasse followed. The serious “peace talks” were again resumed, this time aimed at finding a lasting, or permanent solution, to this re-occurring post-election political impasse in Zanzibar. The talks were successful, and another ‘Peace Agreement’ was signed between CCM and CUF; which became known as “MUAFAKA III”; that recommended the establishment of a ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU) in Zanzibar; to be effected immediately following the next 2010 general election.
As a result of this basic recommendation, the Zanzibar Constitution was promptly amended in order to make provision for the establishment of such ‘Governments of National Unity’ thereafter, after every general election. There are many political benefits that are created by such. ‘Government of National unity’. For example, because it cuts across party lines, it attracts the valuable support of many of those who voted for the losing party; and presumably incorporates the best political brains in the relevant jurisdiction.
Some useful lessons to be learnt.
The 2005 general election.
Once again, the CUF Presidential candidate lost in the 2005 Presidential election. And CUF refused to accept those results. Thus, another political impasse followed. The serious “peace talks” were again resumed, this time aimed at finding a lasting, or permanent solution, to this re-occurring post-election political impasse in Zanzibar. The talks were successful, and another ‘Peace Agreement’ was signed between CCM and CUF; which became known as “MUAFAKA III”; that recommended the establishment of a ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU) in Zanzibar; to be effected immediately following the next 2010 general election.
As a result of this basic recommendation, the Zanzibar Constitution was promptly amended in order to make provision for the establishment of such ‘Governments of National Unity’ thereafter, after every general election. There are many political benefits that are created by such. ‘Government of National unity’. For example, because it cuts across party lines, it attracts the valuable support of many of those who voted for the losing party; and presumably incorporates the best political brains in the relevant jurisdiction.
Some useful lessons to be learnt.
“Boycotts”, it has been said, produce their own negative consequences”. The CUF election boycotts that we have described in this presentation, also offer some useful lessons, which should be learnt. For example, in the case of the CUF boycotts of the Zanzibar Legislature (and the Union Parliament), described above; it is worth noting that they produced the negative consequence of that political party literally being ‘phased out’ of the country’s governance system, and thus being reduced to the status of a mere onlooker; leaving CCM alone to govern the country unchallenged (in the absence of the usual positive challenges which are normally offered by the Opposition camp within the Legislature). This non-participation also deprived a significant section of Zanzibaris of the political benefits accruing from the ‘government of National Unity’; the principal benefit being the resulting “peace and tranquility”; that now exists among the people of Zanzibar.
piomsekwa@gmail.com /0754767576.
piomsekwa@gmail.com /0754767576.
Source: Daily News today.
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