On Tuesday 31st August, 2021; National Assembly Speaker Job Ndugai, MP, delivered judgment on the cases that had been raised separately against two members of Parliament, Hon Jerry Silaa (Ukonga); and Hon. Bishop Josepht Gwajima (Kawe); ordering them to stay out of Parliament for two consecutive sessions; having been found guilty of the offence known in parliamentary parlance as “contempt of Parliament”. This was not the first time for the Parliament of Tanzania to exercise its powers in this particular respect; for even during my period as Speaker, our Parliament had occasion to inflict similar punishment on Hon. Agustino Mrema, then member of Parliament for Temeke; who was suspended from attending sittings of the house for the remainder of the Budget session that was then in progress, which was forty working days.
Despite this fact however, I received, in my capacity as former Speaker of the National Assembly, a torrent of inquiries from journalists working for AZAM Television; seeking to have “more clarification” regarding this action taken by our Parliament. One of their questions was: ‘Who will represent their constituents during the period of their absence?”
I must say I was perplexed by such inquiries, because they disclosed a kind of ignorance that still exists in our society regarding this matter. I remember to have received similar inquiries, when Bunge exercised such powers for the first time in its history, which was on 24th June, 1998; when Hon. Mrema was given similar punishment. Because it had happened for the first time in the history of our House, it was indeed understandable, that people would be anxious to know the basis for such unprecedented action. I therefore wrote, and published, a special article in a publication called “BUNGE NEWS; in which I explained, at very great length, the powers of Parliament to punish its members when they commit specified offences within the House itself; and even gave several examples of how, and when, these powers have been exercised in various parliamentary jurisdiction of Commonwealth countries. (Also see my book titled “Reflections on Tanzania’s First Multi-party Parliament, 1995 – 2000).
However, the inquiries this time by the said journalists amazed me; for I had wrongly assumed that the public is generally aware of Parliament’s powers to punish its errant members, just as the Courts generally do. Hence, my initial response to the journalist who asked the question “who is to represent the interests of their constituents during the period of their suspension” was another question which I asked him, “If an MP is convicted of an offence by a court of law and committed to jail, for say six months, who will represent the interests of his constituents during that period ?. He conceded that there would be no one.
And that is when I discovered that there was lack of knowledge, or of sufficient understanding, of the powers that are vested in Bunge in relation thereto; and especially that this particular power to punish people who commit the offence known as “contempt of Parliament”. This is in common with the similar power which is granted to the courts of law, to punish people who commit the similar offence of “contempt of court”.
I therefore decided to devote today’s article, to providing some detailed information on this matter; and that is what I have attempted to do in the paragraphs that follow here below.
Contempt of parliament and contempt of court “Contempt of parliament” may be described as an offence against the authority of Parliament. That is to say that when any person is deemed to have disobeyed, or disrespectful to the authority of the House or its lawful commands; such person is considered to have acted “in contempt of Parliament”; which is an offence under section 24 of the Parliamentary Immunities, Powers and Privileges Act (no. 3 of 1988); which provides, among other things, that: “Any person shall be guilty of an offence who--
Contempt of parliament and contempt of court “Contempt of parliament” may be described as an offence against the authority of Parliament. That is to say that when any person is deemed to have disobeyed, or disrespectful to the authority of the House or its lawful commands; such person is considered to have acted “in contempt of Parliament”; which is an offence under section 24 of the Parliamentary Immunities, Powers and Privileges Act (no. 3 of 1988); which provides, among other things, that: “Any person shall be guilty of an offence who--
*shows disrespect in speech or manner, towards the Speaker;
*commits any other act of intentional disrespect to or with reference to, the proceedings of the Assembly or of a committee of the Assembly, or to any person presiding over such proceedings”. The procedure for dealing with such matters, is provided for in the Standing Rules of the House.
As already stated above, this power is much in common with the similar power vested in the law courts, to punish persons for contempt of court”; an offence is described as “any act that is done or omitted to be done, inside the Court or out of Court, or with reference to the presiding judge or magistrate, or which obstructs or interferes with in any way hinders the due course of justice” This is in order to ensure that that judicial proceedings are conducted in an atmosphere of seriousness, serenity and dignity.
Parliament’s powers to punish its members..
In all jurisdictions of Commonwealth countries throughout the world, the Parliaments are routinely vested with powers to enforce discipline among its members. The acknowledged parliamentary “Book of Authority” on this matter, Erskine May; (21st edition, p.103), provides as follows in respect of the British Houses of Parliament:- “The penal power that is given to Parliament to punish its members for disorderly conduct and disrespectful acts, has much in common with the authority inherent in the superior courts, to prevent or punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice, or abuse them while in exercise of their responsibilities. By these means, Parliament is enabled to safeguard and enforce their authority without compromise or delay, to which recourse to ordinary courts would give”.
Consequently, in the English case of Bradlaugh v Gosett (1984) 12Q.B.D. 271; Lord Coleridge stated, interalia, as follows:- “the jurisdiction of the House over their own members, and their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it”.
It is presumably common knowledge that our parliamentary procedures and processes were inherited from British parliamentary practice at the time of independence. Thus, right from that time, our Bunge has been making, and from time to time amending, such Rules as was deemed appropriate and desirable, for punishing its errant members. It is these Rules (known as Standing Orders) which empower the House to impose disciplinary measures on any of its members, which the House may consider reasonable and appropriate in the particular circumstances of the relevant case. There are many examples everywhere in the Commonwealth, of suspensions from attendance of parliamentary sessions, which have been routinely imposed on their MPs in fairly recent years.
For example, on 19th February, 1971; the Parliament of Zambia suspended its member, Hon. Nalumino Mundia, after the Speaker had “named” him for disregarding the authority of the Chair. The motion moved for his suspension was passed, and he was suspended from attending the House sessions for a period of three months. Hon. Nalumino Mundia instituted Court proceedings to challenge his suspension. But the High Court rejected his petition, on the ground that, according to the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, “the internal proceedings of Parliament cannot be questioned in any court”.
And, as already mentioned above, here in Tanzania we have the disciplinary case of Hon. Agustino Lyatonga Mrema, who was MP for Temeke at the material time, and I was the Speaker of that august House.
The facts of that case were as follows:- “ Hon. Agustino Mrema, the Member of Parliament representing Temeke constituency in Dar es Salaam; had been ordered by the Speaker to produce documents which would substantiate the serious allegations which he had made in his speech in the House; alleging that a meeting of Government officials held on a date which he mentioned, had decided that he (Mrema), plus three other persons, were to be assassinated before the year 2000 (which wa general election year). He further claimed that one of the intended victims (whom he named as Imran Kombe, retired Army General and head of the Security Services Department) had, in fact, been already killed by the police, in the process of implementing that evil scheme. The Speaker gave him five days, within which to produce the necessary supporting documents.
On the last of the allotted days, Hon. Mrema dutifully presented the documents upon which he intended to rely in proving his case, and was given ample time to speak in support of his documents. In the general debate following his presentation, the House was of the unanimous view that he had failed to substantiate th allegations which he had made on the floor of the House. Thereupon, a motion was moved for his immediate suspension from attending the sittings of the House “for the remainder of the Budget session” which was then in progress. The motion was carried nemine contradicente (with no one dissenting).
Thereafter, just as the Zambian Hon. Nalumino Mundia had done in 1971, Hon. Mrema also went to the High Court to challenge his suspension, by filing an application for “stay of execution” of parliament’s resolution to suspend him, in Misc Civil Application no. 36 of 1998; in which he asserted that “his fundamental right of representing his constituency” had been violated.
In the course of his judgment of this case, Judge E.W. Katiti made the following pertinent comments:-“I am yet to hear of an authority, holding that staying in Parliament during its session, at any cost or under any circumstances, is an MP’s constitutional right, and that therefore sending a member out of the House on suspension, is a breach of that right, and is therefore unconstitutional . . . I am confidently convinced, that Mrema’s suspension was a disciplinary action taken against him by the House; which has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the same in order to maintain its dignity and integrity. I therefore hold that Mrema’s suspension was within the constitutional powers of Parliament”.
Looking back now at that case, I get the feeling that Hon. Mrema was, actually, hugely lucky to have got away with such a light sentence of only forty days’ suspension. This is because the National Assembly could have taken the alternative route of prosecuting him in a Court of law; which is allowed by section 12(3) of the Parliamentary immunities, Powers and Privileges Act, which provides that “The Assembly, in relation to any act, matter or thing, may recommend to the Speaker that that he requests the Attorney General to take necessary steps to bring to trial before a court of competent jurisdiction, any person connected with the commission of an offence under this Act”. One of the offences that may be committed under that Act, is the offence of “perjury”.
The offence of ‘perjury’ is defined as having been committed by “any person who, in any judicial proceeding, knowingly gives false testimony touching on any matter which is material to any question in the proceedings”. And the prescribed punishment for that offence, is “imprisonment for seven years”. Parliament had, obviously, found Hon. Mrema guilty of “giving false testimony” Thus, had he earned such conviction from a court of law, he would have languished in jail for seven long years. He was, therefore, extremely lucky to have escaped being taken through that hard alternative route!
As already stated above, this power is much in common with the similar power vested in the law courts, to punish persons for contempt of court”; an offence is described as “any act that is done or omitted to be done, inside the Court or out of Court, or with reference to the presiding judge or magistrate, or which obstructs or interferes with in any way hinders the due course of justice” This is in order to ensure that that judicial proceedings are conducted in an atmosphere of seriousness, serenity and dignity.
Parliament’s powers to punish its members..
In all jurisdictions of Commonwealth countries throughout the world, the Parliaments are routinely vested with powers to enforce discipline among its members. The acknowledged parliamentary “Book of Authority” on this matter, Erskine May; (21st edition, p.103), provides as follows in respect of the British Houses of Parliament:- “The penal power that is given to Parliament to punish its members for disorderly conduct and disrespectful acts, has much in common with the authority inherent in the superior courts, to prevent or punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice, or abuse them while in exercise of their responsibilities. By these means, Parliament is enabled to safeguard and enforce their authority without compromise or delay, to which recourse to ordinary courts would give”.
Consequently, in the English case of Bradlaugh v Gosett (1984) 12Q.B.D. 271; Lord Coleridge stated, interalia, as follows:- “the jurisdiction of the House over their own members, and their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it”.
It is presumably common knowledge that our parliamentary procedures and processes were inherited from British parliamentary practice at the time of independence. Thus, right from that time, our Bunge has been making, and from time to time amending, such Rules as was deemed appropriate and desirable, for punishing its errant members. It is these Rules (known as Standing Orders) which empower the House to impose disciplinary measures on any of its members, which the House may consider reasonable and appropriate in the particular circumstances of the relevant case. There are many examples everywhere in the Commonwealth, of suspensions from attendance of parliamentary sessions, which have been routinely imposed on their MPs in fairly recent years.
For example, on 19th February, 1971; the Parliament of Zambia suspended its member, Hon. Nalumino Mundia, after the Speaker had “named” him for disregarding the authority of the Chair. The motion moved for his suspension was passed, and he was suspended from attending the House sessions for a period of three months. Hon. Nalumino Mundia instituted Court proceedings to challenge his suspension. But the High Court rejected his petition, on the ground that, according to the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, “the internal proceedings of Parliament cannot be questioned in any court”.
And, as already mentioned above, here in Tanzania we have the disciplinary case of Hon. Agustino Lyatonga Mrema, who was MP for Temeke at the material time, and I was the Speaker of that august House.
The facts of that case were as follows:- “ Hon. Agustino Mrema, the Member of Parliament representing Temeke constituency in Dar es Salaam; had been ordered by the Speaker to produce documents which would substantiate the serious allegations which he had made in his speech in the House; alleging that a meeting of Government officials held on a date which he mentioned, had decided that he (Mrema), plus three other persons, were to be assassinated before the year 2000 (which wa general election year). He further claimed that one of the intended victims (whom he named as Imran Kombe, retired Army General and head of the Security Services Department) had, in fact, been already killed by the police, in the process of implementing that evil scheme. The Speaker gave him five days, within which to produce the necessary supporting documents.
On the last of the allotted days, Hon. Mrema dutifully presented the documents upon which he intended to rely in proving his case, and was given ample time to speak in support of his documents. In the general debate following his presentation, the House was of the unanimous view that he had failed to substantiate th allegations which he had made on the floor of the House. Thereupon, a motion was moved for his immediate suspension from attending the sittings of the House “for the remainder of the Budget session” which was then in progress. The motion was carried nemine contradicente (with no one dissenting).
Thereafter, just as the Zambian Hon. Nalumino Mundia had done in 1971, Hon. Mrema also went to the High Court to challenge his suspension, by filing an application for “stay of execution” of parliament’s resolution to suspend him, in Misc Civil Application no. 36 of 1998; in which he asserted that “his fundamental right of representing his constituency” had been violated.
In the course of his judgment of this case, Judge E.W. Katiti made the following pertinent comments:-“I am yet to hear of an authority, holding that staying in Parliament during its session, at any cost or under any circumstances, is an MP’s constitutional right, and that therefore sending a member out of the House on suspension, is a breach of that right, and is therefore unconstitutional . . . I am confidently convinced, that Mrema’s suspension was a disciplinary action taken against him by the House; which has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the same in order to maintain its dignity and integrity. I therefore hold that Mrema’s suspension was within the constitutional powers of Parliament”.
Looking back now at that case, I get the feeling that Hon. Mrema was, actually, hugely lucky to have got away with such a light sentence of only forty days’ suspension. This is because the National Assembly could have taken the alternative route of prosecuting him in a Court of law; which is allowed by section 12(3) of the Parliamentary immunities, Powers and Privileges Act, which provides that “The Assembly, in relation to any act, matter or thing, may recommend to the Speaker that that he requests the Attorney General to take necessary steps to bring to trial before a court of competent jurisdiction, any person connected with the commission of an offence under this Act”. One of the offences that may be committed under that Act, is the offence of “perjury”.
The offence of ‘perjury’ is defined as having been committed by “any person who, in any judicial proceeding, knowingly gives false testimony touching on any matter which is material to any question in the proceedings”. And the prescribed punishment for that offence, is “imprisonment for seven years”. Parliament had, obviously, found Hon. Mrema guilty of “giving false testimony” Thus, had he earned such conviction from a court of law, he would have languished in jail for seven long years. He was, therefore, extremely lucky to have escaped being taken through that hard alternative route!
Piomsekwa@gmail.com / 0754767576.
Source: Daily News Thursday.
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